The Syrian's Dilemma
On February 13, 2014, I told Jerome MacDonald, in an interview on Worldview on
Chicago Public Radio, "On the strategic level, I think that if we do not
succeed in Syria, there are so many
issues over the next fifty years of American foreign policy that will be traced
back to President Obama's administration."
Syrians in their search for freedom find themselves in a dilemma. In spite the warnings about the consequences
of the vacuum of power in Syria since the early stages of the militarization of
the revolution, the American administration did not correctly read this warning
until the fall of Mosul. There is a quasi agreement among observers that we must
have ground troops to deal with ISL. The Syrian dilemma is in the answer to the
question, Who will send their troops under the cover of US airpower to deal
with ISL? The short answer is "No
one." Whatever the answer, the Syrian rebels are going to have the short
end of the deal. The other leg of the
dilemma can be read in the absence of the word "democracy" in the
last three speeches of the president.
President Obama is framing the question solely
with a military vision. Whatever
happened to the revolution for democracy, human rights, and freedom? Many
Syrians see the consequences of President Obama's vision will put them on the
road ending with the choice among living under a military regime the way that
Egypt is governed today, or other US allied Middle Eastern Monarchies or under
the Iranian occupation in the way Baghdad is controlled by the Iranians
today.
The road as we see it today shows that the
members (Islamists or non-Islamists) of the Syrian Revolution are going to pay
dearly and vainly for the fall of ISL.
Under the absence of any international and regional guarantees or plans
to help transform Syria into a real democracy, and under the total disregard of
the US administration and its allies toward the original purpose of the Syrian
Revolution, delaying the commitment of
the US to a real democratic Syria actually means the return of Syria to the
situation before the revolution with the addition of all the consequent
destruction. Assad shall be removed in
the same way that al-Malki has gone, but the Syrian Regime shall be reproduced in
the same way that Mubarak's regime was reproduced. The rebels will come out of the fight against
ISL exhausted, having already lost many of its leaders. It will be in no shape to fight against the
re-cycling of the Assad regime under a different façade. The rebel's situation shall be worse if Assad
succeeds in establishing a tactical cooperation with ISL as he proved capable
of during the American occupation of Iraq.
The American administration's strategy has
no regard to what the rebels want.
Regional dictators are taking care of appeasing them and bringing them into
alignment by threat or by elimination of all dissenting opinions in the rows of
the revolution. Even if the rebels
succeed to reach a consensus on the return to the non-violent revolution (an
idealistic and farfetched assumption) and stand neutral between the regime, ISL
and the USA, the rebels have no guarantee that in such an environment they will
not turn into the weakest link in a conflict governed only by the power of
fire. The US administration's discourse
ignores the real reason behind the strength of ISL. This discourse announces publicly its
rejection of the Assad regime but at the same time believes that the changes to
Baghdad's regime needed to fight ISL are of a cosmetic nature. My argument here might feel "paranoid"
for some. However, President Obama is
aware of the consequences of his strategy on the people of the region and their
democratic inspiration. If he believes
that Somalia and Yemen were "American success stories," I hate to
inform him that the Syrians have not revolted
in the hopes of turning their country into neither Somalia nor Yemen. In one word, a comprehensive
vision for a free and democratic Middle
East can make the Syrian people true and dependable allies to US foreign
policy.
Mohyeddin Kassar
9/12/2014